The appearance of non-Russian fighters in the Russian “militias” in
the Donbas is not a curiosity but rather a conscious Moscow policy to
prevent any possibility of fraternization between ethnic Russians and
Ukrainians, something that if it happened could undermine Moscow’s goals
there, according to Andrey Okara.
Many journalists and commentators have treated sightings of Buryats,
Chechens, or other non-Russians on the Russian side of the lines as a
curiosity or even source of amusement, but in fact, the Russian analyst says, the dispatch and use of non-Russians in Ukraine is very much part of the Kremlin’s policy.
Kremlin political technologists and “the theoreticians of hybrid war from the General Staff and Ministry of Defense
of the Russian Federation have come up with a very correct (from the
point of view of the interests of the Kremlin) step.” They have worked
to ensure that on the frontlines of the fighting, those on Moscow’s side
are not ethnic Russians.
Instead, he continues, “on the side of the Russian world, fight not
ethnic Slavs but non-Slavs – Chechens, Buryats, even Yakuts, Daghestanis
and Ingush.”
Why is this happening? “Because,” Okara writes, “ethnic Russians,
even the most pro-Putin and most committed vatniks … in an extreme
situation always find a common language and point of contact with
Ukrainians.” That doesn’t happen with Buryats and Chechens, on the one
hand, and Ukrainians, on the other.
According to Okara, “there are many occasions when Russian
‘volunteers’ phone Ukrainian ‘fighters’ and say: well, guys, you’d best
get away from here, we will be firing on you there.’ Such situations are
not rare in the opposite direction as well,” the Russian commentator
says. But again this doesn’t happen with non-Slavs.
He concludes his articles by saying that in this way “the Russian
world has donned the mask of the Horde. Or perhaps alternatively,” it
was always a horde but until now operating as the Russian world? Or
even, “the Russian world is a slightly modified and externally
Slavicized Horde?”
In the end, then, Okara too treats this as more an occasion for
levity than as something serious. But there are three reasons for
thinking that to the extent his analysis of Russian intentions in using
non-Slavic soldiers is correct, this is likely to be a very serious
development indeed.
First, and most immediately, it suggests real
command and control problems in the “LNR” and “DNR” forces, that junior
officers and men and possibly more senior ones as well are acting on the
basis of the oft-expressed view that the Ukrainians they are fighting
are not a separate nation but members of the same people as themselves.
If the ethnic Russian militants are acting in that way, this could
make it more–not less–difficult for the Donbas regimes to advance and
make it more not less probable that Moscow will ultimately have to
intervene even more massively with regular troops if it wants to push
Ukrainian forces back.
Second, it means that the Kremlin has some real
doubts about the loyalty of precisely the ethnic group in whose name it
claims to act, the ethnic Russians. If it feels compelled to use
non-Russians as a kind of modern Janissary
force, such a policy will infuriate some Russians – and especially
military commanders — even as it may lead non-Russians to make demands.
And third, over time, any fraternization between
Russian fighters and Ukrainian forces could lead to the spread of ideas
of the Ukrainian revolution first to these fighters and then back into
Russia itself when these fighters return home, perhaps the Kremlin’s
worst nightmare of all in the current situation.
Euromaïdanpress
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