Ending Europe’s blame game

Mainstream Europe’s near-audible sigh of relief is premature. The failure of France’s militantly eurosceptic Front National to win control of any of the country’s 13 powerful regional administrations does not signal an end to the threat of right-wing populism. On the contrary, far from being defeated the FN is still set to be the standard-bearer around which Europe’s other extreme nationalist and anti-EU parties can rally.

This time in France, the centre-right and centre-left parties colluded in a tactical voting pact to block the FN. But they will not be able to do that in the presidential elections of Spring 2017. For those, they must each field a candidate knowing that one of the two mainstream presidential hopefuls may very well be knocked out for the final round of voting by FN party leader Marine Le Pen.
Her setback in failing to win outright control of any of the regions is a respite, but not a sign of dwindling FN support. The FN won a record 6.7m votes and its seats in the regional assemblies skyrocketed from 118 to 358. Marine Le Pen looks on course to be a serious contender for the Elysée Palace.
The French and German elections that will determine Europe’s political landscape are not due until 2017, but next year already promises to be turbulent. It will most probably see the long-awaited referendum on whether the UK stays in the EU, and Brexit fears are rising as the ranks of UKIP’s 4m voters in last May’s general elections are liable to be swelled by concerns over immigration.
Elsewhere in Europe, the anti-EU populists are in the ascendant. Some opinion polls in Germany put support for the right-wing AfD party at over 10%, creating major uncertainties about the outcome of the autumn 2017 elections. Anti-immigrant sentiment in Sweden and the Netherlands is powering respectively the rise of the populist PVV and SD parties. The hard right Danish People’s Party has forced itself inside the governing coalition and in Poland and Hungary the populists are in power.
How then, have all these shifts come about? Who or what is to blame for the new face of European politics and the seemingly inexorable decline in the progressive values that so many Europeans have long prided themselves on?
The blame game of 21st century European politics is complex, but deserves much closer analysis. The mainstream elites are being blamed for the woes that have befallen so many people in Europe; falling living standards since the financial and economic crises that erupted in 2008 have been paralleled by a widening wealth gap between rich and poor. Mainstream politicians who promise a better tomorrow cannot easily escape blame when tomorrow turned out to be worse than yesterday.
Many voters in Europe also blame globalisation, believing that the employment opportunities of youthful jobseekers are “stolen” by low wage competitors, either migrants or workers in the factories of Asia. As well as singling out their own governments and political leaders as having failed to defend their interests, disappointed voters are also placing the blame on “Europe”.
The European project may be the first victim of the new populism. So it’s up to the EU and its supporters and institutions to confront it and systematically demolish the arguments that Europe’s ever-closer union has somehow aggravated the problems of people in its member states.
Yes, Brussels is to blame, although not for the reasons its detractors advance. It is to blame for playing down the demographic dangers that confront Europe and the structural weaknesses slowing economic growth. The rapid ageing that within a quarter-century will cut the average ratio of Europe’s workers to retirees from four to two demands a major re-think on immigration. And so too does Europe’s steadily declining productivity.
This isn’t to say that the Commission and all the other players in EU institutions have actively disguised these major problems. But they have failed to highlight them; the EU’s impenetrable jargon and its reluctance to become embroiled in national politics have prevented it from rebutting the eurosceptics’ rabble-rousing accusations.
Like the politicians who promised golden tomorrows, Brussels is blameworthy for having oversold the EU’s capacity to deliver. But its value remains that of an honest broker that reconciles competing national demands in the wider interests of all 500m Europeans. That means naming and shaming member governments that don’t deliver, publicising league tables of successes and failures, and owning up to the EU’s own bureaucratic sins.
Above all, it means refuting far more forcibly than Brussels has ever dared the populists’ siren call that Europe’s economic weaknesses and security vulnerabilities are better addressed nationally than at a European level.

Giles Merritt